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1.1   Background 
This paper assesses the present state of quantitative literature which seeks to 
evaluate the potential impacts which would follow from global services trade 
liberalization as it relates to developing countries.  It is important to emphasize that what 
are frequently referred to as developing countries are themselves also a heterogeneous 
group of countries.  They span rapidly growing economies in Asia, negative growth 
economies (in GDP/capita) in Africa, middle income and very poor countries, small and 
large, landlocked and ocean access; heavily regulated and recently liberalized.  I prefer 
the term poorer countries, and use this interchangeably with the term developing 
countries in the text.  Much of the literature at issue is relatively recent, and is scattered in 
working papers and other less accessible sources.  Policy makers clearly need help in 
unraveling this at times confusing and fragmentary picture of what the research 
community has to offer to guide their deliberations.  This paper aims to do this rather 
than to advocate particular policy positions on global services liberalization. 
 
1.2  Nature of Services 
The paper begins by characterizing services as a majority of activity for most 
OECD economies (as measured by employment, and by value added originating), and a 
smaller but still large portion of activity for poorer developing countries.  It suggests that 
so-called “core” services can best be thought of (see Melvin 1989) as relating to 
intermediation through time (banking, insurance) or space (telecoms, transportation, 
retailing, wholesaling), with a wide range of diverse additional service items making up   3
the balance of what most people refer to as services (tourism, consulting services, 
government services, utilities).  This diverse range of activities is typically treated in 
quantitative studies as a single homogenous entity, frequently labeled as services for 
analytical convenience, when in fact its heterogeneity suggests a different treatment for 
each.  This heterogeneity is, in my view, key to better understanding how services trade 
liberalization could affect poorer countries. 
 
1.3  Impacts of Liberalization on Poorer Countries 
  There is a general presumption in the poorer countries that they will lose from 
global services trade liberalization since their domestic service industries are inefficient 
and non-competitive.  This view is despite the arguments from economists as to the gains 
to domestic consumers from lower prices and the joint benefits which accrue to both 
exporting and importing countries from exploiting comparative advantage and improved 
market access opportunities abroad.  It is also despite the commonly held view that the 
production of many services are labour intensive, which economists believe should be the 
source of comparative advantage for poorer developing countries in services provision.  
There unfortunately appear to be few if no studies of the relative inefficiency of local 
versus foreign service providers in developing country service markets which allow the 
strength of these arguments to be evaluated on empirical grounds. 
  This caution towards global services trade liberalization in the developing world 
seems to reflect two concerns.  One is the general assumption in the developing world 
that any future negotiated global liberalization of services trade will be largely one sided 
in the results it will yield.  Their belief is that  if new WTO multilateral (or even regional)   4
services liberalization is negotiated, developed country service providers will likely gain 
significantly improved access to developing country service markets, but the converse 
(significantly improved access for developing country service providers to developed 
country service markets) will likely not happen.  Asymmetry in negotiating power is one 
reason cited for this possible outcome.  The presumption is that the present regulatory 
structure for most service market segments will remain in place in OECD countries, and 
few significant improvements in access to developed country markets for developing 
country service providers will occur.  This outcome, for instance, is reflected in recent 
US bilateral agreements, including the US-Chile agreement. 
In reality, through the process of ongoing regulatory reform in the OECD, 
changes are in fact being made in market access arrangements for developing country 
service providers, though these are not necessarily reflected in scheduled commitments in 
GATS in the WTO.  Another important and neglected dimension to this conclusion is 
South-South trade, and the potential that developing countries have much to gain from 
liberalization of markets in other developing countries.  The point is that in terms of 
model based (or quantitative) evaluations of the impacts of services trade liberalization, 
were genuine two sided liberalization to take place with their low wage rates developing 
country providers could well benefit.  This is especially so if there are scale economies in 
service provision (as in banking, for instance).  Most of the available studies of what 
benefits might flow from services liberalization assume there will be full multilateral 
opening of service markets, and results of studies must be interpreted in light of this 
presumption.  If one-sided liberalization is the expected outcome, developing countries   5
may well remain opposed to liberalization on the grounds it is non-reciprocal despite the 
results of studies. 
  The second caution that developing countries express is the nature and size of the 
adjustments in domestic economies which services liberalization may imply.  One 
dimension of adjustment relates to potential foreign majority ownership and control of 
provision in key service sectors, and the related security and cultural concerns.  Foreign 
entities having access to and control over bank records and financial information of 
domestic residents, for instance, is seen in some countries as unacceptable.  Also, a 
vibrant and vital domestic broadcast or film industry may be viewed as integral to 
national cultural identity.  Added to such concerns is the potential size of labour market 
adjustments if domestic banks are displaced by foreign banks, domestic by foreign 
airlines, and other large changes in the organization of labour intensive sectors which 
might follow after liberalization. 
 
1.4  Issues Addressed in the Paper 
  Against this background, the paper identifies three central issues which existing 
literature on the quantification of the potential benefits to developing countries of 
services trade liberalization raises.  For simplicity in the discussion of studies I assume, 
as in the literature, that this is in fact multilateral liberalization rather than the unilateral 
liberalization developing countries presume it may well be in reality. 
  The first is the representation of and measurement of barriers to services trade in 
individual countries, and the associated issue of measuring the size of services trade 
itself.  Both the level and composition of global services trade is poorly measured at   6
present because there is no formal customs clearance for services trade.  Despite this, the 
literature consensus is that services trade is large (the WTO put it at 30% of combined 
trade in goods and services), and growing (at perhaps double the rate of goods trade). 
Current information on barriers to flows of services trade reflects a number of sources.  
One measures the quantity impacts from various restrictions as estimated by economic 
models.  Another uses estimates of price differentials for across domestic and foreign 
service providers across national markets.  Yet another is frequency data showing how 
often regulatory measures are used in particular service segments in particular countries 
(see Hoekman (1995)).  Tax equivalents are used in some of the literature to capture 
associated barriers to FDI flows which might otherwise accompany freer service trade 
flows (see Dee and Hanslow (2000)). 
In the paper I suggest that these are major conceptual problems with all of these 
estimates of the size of barriers, while acknowledging that no other meaningful data exist 
which can be used and many problems inevitably arise with whatever approach is 
followed.  By way of illustration, frequency data
1 do not allow users to differentiate 
between those barriers which restrict trade (i.e. are binding constraints on trade), and 
those which do not restrict trade because they are redundant (i.e. are non binding 
constraints).  Neither do studies substantively enumerate and represent the various ways 
in which restrictions on services trade apply and how these affect the assessment of 
impact, nor do they assess the relative severity of barriers.  To an economist working on 
the impacts of distortions of trade, available barrier estimates from frequency data in no 
way provide meaningful estimates of marginal barriers to trade.  Another example is that 
                                                 
1 The UNCTAD MAST (Measures Affecting Services Trade) dataset is one of the more recent and 
comprehensive of these frequency data sets.   7
if data on costs of service provision in different markets are obtained, any differences 
across markets may merely reflect differences in domestic regulatory environments and 
not barriers to entry for foreign service providers.  Price differences across countries for 
services can also reflect quality differentials across countries rather than barriers.  Using 
model results to infer barriers to trade can yield outcomes that quantity impacts from 
barriers may be negative from model residuals even where it is clear that binding 
restraints on trade apply. 
  A second issue discussed is the interpretation of results from existing model based 
literature seeking to quantify the impacts of trade liberalization in services (see Robinson 
et al (1999), Dee and Hanslow (2000) and Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002)).  Most of 
what is available involves numerical simulation exercises using (typically global) general 
equilibrium models based on conventional models of trade liberalization in goods (see 
Whalley (1985)).  In these exercises, producer services are typically identified as an input 
into intermediate production and barriers to service trade are represented in the form of 
advalorem tariff like restrictions.  These can be in tax equivalent (for FDI flows) or tariff 
equivalent (for service flows) form.  The size of initial barriers, how they change under 
liberalization, elasticities, and the size of service trade flows, along with relative country 
size and any differences in market structure then determines results much as in 
conventional goods models of trade. 
  Several problems are encountered in interpreting the results from available 
studies.  One is that even taken on their own merits results appear to be confusingly 
contradictory, and especially so for individual developing countries.  For example, Dee 
and Hanslow (2000) produce results showing extremely large gains from services   8
liberalization in the Uruguay Round for certain developing countries (a 14.6% of GDP 
gain for China, and 5.1% gain for Indonesia).  They also suggest globally, that over one 
half the total gains from goods and services liberalization accrue from services 
liberalization.  In contrast, Robinson et al (1999) using similar GTAP data put the gains 
to China at 0.34% of GDP, ASEAN and 1.29%, and South Asia at 1.13%.  Another 
example is that Verikios and Zhang (2000) suggest losses to Malaysia from telecom 
liberalization, and losses to Indonesia from financial services liberalization using the 
same data as Dee and Hanslow.  They show only small gains for China.  There are 
important differences in approach between these studies.  Dee and Hanslow explicitly 
incorporate GATS mode 3 restrictions while Robinson et al. use a modeling approach 
which does not differentiate between cross country factor flows and provision of goods 
and services.  Also, different estimates of barriers are incorporated in the two models.  
Brown, Deardorff and Stern suggest global gains from Doha Round liberalization of $574 
billion per year with the large majority ($413 billion) arising from services, and the 
largest absolute gains going to developed countries.  Fully explaining all the differences 
in the magnitude of the results is difficult, and reconciling disparities in results is difficult 
when seemingly similar data sources are involved. 
  Another problem is that there is analytical literature which purports to show that 
when intermediation services are explicitly represented in their true economic form, 
rather then being represented in advalorem equivalent form, the two fundamental 
theorems of welfare economies need not hold.  Because of this property, welfare impacts 
from liberalization in services trade (even in small open economies) can be negative 
rather than positive as generally presumed in the goods like models used in the literature.    9
Ryan (1990) was an early piece to point this out.  Chia and Whalley (1997) provide an 
example of welfare worsening liberalization in the case of trade liberalization in banking 
services.  Bhatterai and Whalley (1998) show how explicitly modelling telecoms 
liberalization in a network structure can change perceptions as to the division of the gains 
from liberalization between small and large countries.  The implication seems to be that 
only limited confidence can be attached to results obtained from the advalorem 
equivalent modelling used in numerical literature because the analytical structures used 
rule out alterative results.  This problem would arise even were the results of individual 
studies not contradictory one with another. 
 
1.5  Key Features of Model Results 
  Despite these problems, even though they are contradictory across countries, a 
central broad feature of results taken as a whole is that in models where services are 
treated as akin to goods and there is no factor mobility, effects are positive but small for 
most countries.  However, where FDI flows enter (effectively capturing capital flows) 
effects are much larger and more variable across countries.  This suggests that it may be 
the case that as surrogate liberalization of global factor markets, services liberalization 
can have big effects and this could be the best way to view it in assessing the potential 
impacts on poorer developing countries.  Both some earlier and recent models capture 
FDI effects (effectively GATS Mode 3 commercial presence and ownership restrictions) 
and more recent work captures labour mobility effects (GATS Mode 4 restrictions on 
mobility of service providers).  Existing literature estimates suggest very large global 
gains from the removal of immigration restrictions to cross border flows of labour   10
services, and seem to point to a conclusion that this could be the biggest part of the 
services liberalization nexus for developing countries.  It perhaps suggests that 
developing countries should push for immigration and worker mobility restrictions to be 
included in GATS negotiations in the WTO, even though developed countries are 
cautious about doing so. 
  The paper also discusses recent econometric literature linking growth 
performance to services trade liberalization (see Francois and Schuknecht (1999) and 
Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian (2001)).  Importantly, Mattoo et al, claim that 
growth rates of up to 1.5 percentage points higher occur for economies that liberalize 
their telecoms and financial services sectors:  Francois and Schuknecht also claim strong 
growth effects follow empirically from services liberalizations.  While seemingly 
powerful in their policy thrust, there are problems once again in interpreting the results.  
One is that excluded variables can be the larger source of higher growth.  For example, 
higher growth rates may largely reflect higher savings and investment rates, which 
generate more intermediation and hence more service use.  So it could be that the higher 
investment rates drive higher growth rates more so than larger use of services following 
upon liberalization.  This work is also generally a theoretical and does not differentiate 
between once and for all level effects from liberalization and permanent growth effects.  
It also needs to be borne in mind that endogenous growth literature also provides 
arguments as to why protection can be welfare improving if there are uninternalized 
externalities (as in so-called A-K models) (see Young (1996)) and these may also apply 
to services as well as to goods.   11
  The bottom line conclusions offered are that while services liberalization is 
indeed an important issue for developing countries, the dominant issues for them are 
likely to be how much access improvement will they experience in service markets 
abroad (both in OECD and other developing country markets), and what will be the 
impacts for them if there are changes in labour mobility restrictions.  For now studies 
which address these issues remain informed by poor data, major conceptual difficulties, 
and in the modelling area are characterized by contradictory results.  On the other hand 
the limited econometric studies available point to strong growth effects.  The outcome is 
that their contribution to policy debate in the area may seem unclear and confusing to 
outsiders but this often is the state of academic research as it relates to current policy 
debates.  The key themes of potentially viewing services trade liberalization as surrogate 
liberalization of factor (capital and labour flows), and focusing on mode 3 and 
(especially) mode 4 GATS liberalization might be the most important insights for policy 
makers to draw.   12
2.  General Considerations in Evaluating the Impacts of Services 
Trade Liberalization on Developing Countries 
Prior to reviewing existing literature relevant to the developing country interest in 
global services trade liberalization, it may be helpful to first highlight a number of wider 
conceptual issues relevant to the discussion. 
 
2.1  The Developing Country Interest in Trade Liberalization in General 
  The presumption behind most discussion of potential developing country interests 
in services trade liberalization is that countries gain from more open services trade in 
ways which are similar to trade liberalization in goods.  This reflects the idea that 
countries have differing comparative advantage in the production of both goods and 
services, and more open trade will allow comparative advantage to be more fully 
exploited in all countries.  Put simply, the thinking is that propositions regarding the 
gains from freer trade apply equally to both goods and services.  There are, however, 
many complications with this line of argument even though it is instinctively where most 
academic economists finish up in their thinking. 
  First, accepting for now the proposition that trade in services and goods can be 
treated as analytically similar in this way, the issue of how developing countries benefit 
from services trade liberalization is subject to all of the nuances set out in the literature on 
trade policy.  While most academic economists instinctively believe that there are 
benefits for all countries from freer trade, over the years they have nevertheless devoted a 
considerable portion of their intellectual energy to producing arguments as to why the 
contrary may be true.  These include arguments for an optimal tariff (terms of trade   13
improvement from protection), for infant industry protection, for tariffs which transfer 
rents (rent shifting), and tariffs that offset other domestic distortions.  These arguments 
presumably apply equally to trade in services and goods if they are analytically similar, 
and hence qualify the presumption that freer global trade in service is a good thing. 
  Second, there are a series of arguments about protection of trade in goods that 
relate in one way or another primarily to developing countries and these presumably also 
come into play in discussing trade in services.  Examples are that increased trade can be 
immiserizing due to a terms of trade deterioration; in a Lewis model with traditional 
practices in agricultural sectors (average rather than marginal product pricing of labour) 
protection of traded goods sectors is called for to pull labour into import competing 
modern sectors; in a Harris Todaro model with an urban sector specific downward rigid 
real wage and unemployment, an import subsidy can be beneficial. 
  In addition there are many broader issues identified in the literature about the 
form global trade liberalization takes and hence its impacts on developing countries, and 
these would again apply equally to services and goods.  If, as is usually argued, countries 
gain more from improved access to larger foreign markets (given the larger size of OECD 
markets) than from their own liberalization, what they should seek is genuinely 
multilateral liberalization rather than only participate in unilateral liberalization.  This 
should include freer South-South trade in services, as well as OECD/non OECD trade.  
Being smaller economically, developing countries have less bargaining power than larger 
developed countries in trade negotiations, and this applies equally to trade in goods and 
services and hence globally negotiated outcomes may well be asymmetric.   14
Developing countries also often argue that both trade liberalization and its 
impacts need to be evaluated in the context of its wider impacts on the developmental 
process, including implications for growth and poverty, which are not typically centrally 
discussed in conventional trade literature.  These arguments also presumably apply 
equally to trade in goods and services. 
Hence while the presumption is that global liberalization of trade in services will 
yield gains for both developed and poorer developing countries, and hence the central 
issue is to evaluate the size of any resulting gains, it needs to be borne in mind that the 
arguments even from conventional literature on trade in goods are more nuanced than 
this. 
 
2.2  Differences between trade in services and trade in goods 
  Accepting for now that there is a general presumption that global trade 
liberalization in either goods and services is broadly beneficial for developing countries 
(a contention some would challenge), the next issue is whether goods and services differ 
in some important way.  Do they need to be approached differently in evaluating the 
quantitative impacts involved? 
  This is a key issue in discussing the impacts of services liberalization on poorer 
developing countries, since much if not most of the existing quantitative literature treats 
services as analytically similar to goods.  The approach is to define a single product, 
commonly called producer services, which is an input into production and against which 
trade protection operates with a tariff like instrument.  Liberalization is then a reduction 
in or elimination of the tariff.  Not surprisingly numerical results from models are similar   15
to those of trade liberalization in goods.  Small positive gains accrue to most countries if 
there are no factor mobility effects captured, as in goods liberalization models. 
  In reality, however, the term services captures a heterogeneous group of activities 
spanning banking, insurance, transportation, telecoms, consulting services, retail and 
wholesale trade, and several others.  Much of this activity facilitates transactions, 
providing the economic function of intermediation either through time or space which, as 
pointed out by Melvin (1989), when explicitly modelled as such can produce different 
implications for trade liberalization. 
  Ryan (1990, 1992), for instance, shows that when banking is explicitly modelled 
as intermediation services that themselves do not directly provide utility, but instead 
facilitate intermediation between borrowers and lenders, liberalization of trade in banking 
services can reduce GDP, and even welfare.  Chia and Whalley (1997) have produced a 
numerical example of welfare worsening trade liberalization in banking services based on 
this approach.  The results from such examples reflect the use of specific formulations 
and parameter values and functional forms and are hence not general results.  They do, 
however, suggest a weakening in the general presumption that gains will be automatically 
shared between developed and poorer developing countries if global liberalization of 
services trade occurs.  Bhatterai and Whalley (1999) provide a related analysis of the 
implications of liberalization in network services (effectively telecoms) where the same 
theme emerges that recognition of the special features of individual services changes the 
analysis of the impacts of services liberalization. 
  Another difference is that to achieve meaningful trade liberalization in services 
may require modifications of factor mobility restrictions which may not be needed for   16
goods liberalization.  This is recognized in Modes 3 and 4 of GATS which effectively 
relate to capital (FDI) mobility and labour (service provider) mobility.  With restricted or 
segmented global factor markets (and especially labour markets), large effects can come 
from services liberalization if such liberalization becomes an indirect mechanism for 
liberalizing global factor markets.  This is a central issue for the poorer developing 
countries who have long pushed for liberalization of immigration controls in OECD 
countries, since global services liberalization may be a vehicle for them to achieve this 
end. 
  Thus whether services are treated as being different from goods, whether their 
economic characteristics are explicitly modelled, and how factor flows are treated can all 
make a large difference to the perceived effects of trade liberalization in services (and 
both to sign and magnitude). 
 
2.3  Types of services trade liberalization; deregulation/competition/barrier 
reduction 
  A further key issue in discussing trade/liberalization in services and its impacts on 
poorer developing countries is that the types and forms of liberalization need to be fully 
and carefully specified.  As a result, these often have to be discussed in ways which do 
not arise with liberalization in goods trade.  Barriers to the flow of goods typically arise 
as customs and other physical restraints on trade are administered at national borders.  
Thus, for goods trade, most discussion of liberalization focuses on tariffs (and less so) on 
other instruments.   17
  Within the services trade community and in the policy literature in general, there 
is an understanding that the outcomes of services liberalization will depend heavily on 
the regulatory environment and the need for liberalization to be underpinned by a sound 
regulatory framework.  Restraints on trade no longer apply in the same way as for goods 
at borders; a wider variety of restraints than those typically applicable to goods apply 
beyond borders and hence within national markets.  Also, since services generally have 
no tangible form and hence cannot be physically restrained at the border, but typically 
foreign service providers need to have to have entry to the national market either for the 
service itself.  The entity that provides the service, or service providers themselves may 
be restricted in terms of their mobility, and it is here that restraints on services trade 
effectively operate. 
  Barriers to service provision may operate through entry barriers to local markets 
(rights to establish, or to provide services), rules on conduct (regulation), on the number 
and size of competitors in a market (competition rules), and in other ways.  As a result 
many more barriers come into play with services than with goods trade.  They are more 
complex, and their effects more numerous.  Market structure, conduct, and performance 
are all key and all need to be evaluated when discussing quantitative impacts of global 
liberalization of services trade on poorer developing countries. 
 
2.4  How different are barriers across developed and developing countries? 
  The actual numbers for barriers to service trade flows used in different studies for 
barriers to service trade flows are discussed in more detail below, but it is worth pointing 
out at this stage that the general perception is both that services trade is considerably   18
more heavily restricted than goods trade (and in manufactures in particular, rather than in 
agriculture where high barriers still apply), and considerably more so in the poorer 
developing countries than in developed countries.  As noted in the introduction, 
developing countries in reality are an extremely heterogeneous group of countries with 
sharply differing characteristics and use of restrictions on service provision, but for now 
we will use this terminology in discussing barrier differences across broad country types. 
  The precise extent of market segmentation across countries in services is not well 
documented, but is often claimed to be large.  For example, despite claims of ever 
growing globalization, in most countries around the world branch banking is still 
provided by local banks, insurance policies are still written by local companies, internal 
air transportation is by local carriers, as is road, rail, and maritime.  Retailing continues to 
be dominated by domestic retailers in most country markets. 
  Among developed countries, there seems to be evidence of growing cross country 
service trade.  Some of this reflects cross country foreign direct investment, or 
buyouts/mergers of local service providers by foreign entities.  Thus, growing market 
integration in the services areas seems to be occurring in these countries, even though 
domestic regulations often seem slow to change.  In the developing countries in contrast, 
less market integration and cross market penetration in services seems to have occurred 
although the process would be poised to accelerate more rapidly than in the developed 
world.  For now, local service providers remain as locally owned entities, and 
interdeveloping country service trade is small in part because of barriers to foreign 
service providers.  Service trade as a share of total trade is also correspondingly smaller 
in developed than in developing countries.   19
  The presumption in any quantification of impacts of global liberalization of 
services trade on poorer developing countries is that barriers to service trade are currently 
large in both developed and developing countries, and while relaxing a little, probably  
are more restrictive on average in developing than in developed country markets.  This 
presumption underlies arguments from the policy community for large potential effects to 
follow from services trade liberalization as it relates to South-South trade.   20
3.  The Representation and Measurement of Barriers to Services 
 Trade 
  As noted earlier, both characterizing and measuring the size of barriers to the 
international flow of services is considerably more complex and nuanced than is true for 
barriers faced by international trade in goods and the problems encountered in this area 
also affect any discussion of the quantitative impacts of services trade liberalization on 
developing countries. 
Thinking on barriers facing international trade in goods in part reflects the 
structure of the 1967 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade incorporated into the 
Charter of the WTO as GATT 1994.  The GATT structure tries to limit barriers to goods 
flows to transparent and bound tariffs which can then be negotiated down to 
progressively lower levels. 
The principle of National Treatment (no discrimination against foreign goods 
within national economies) in the WTO Charter implies that all barriers apply only at the 
border as goods enter national markets.  This is typically through a tariff or quota, 
although quotas are formally banned under Article 11 of GATT 1994 in the WTO 
charter.  For services the structure under the 1994 GATT is different.  No national 
borders apply for services trade since there is no customs clearance.  Barriers to the free 
international flow of services take many other forms in place of tariffs; regulation, entry 
barriers, restrictions on the mobility of service providers.  The structure of the GATS thus 
differs from the GATT; for instance, National Treatment does not stand as an automatic 
right and must be bargained for.  This all makes discussion of and classification of 
barriers to service flows more difficult than for goods, since trade economists are usually   21
drawn back to analogies with restrictions on goods flows, and look for tariff like 
measures of barriers.  Many of analogies can be misleading and even ultimately 
uniformative. 
 
3.1  Approaches to Classifying and Measuring Barriers to Services Trade 
There are basically two different approaches used in the literature to classify 
barriers to trade in service items for the purposes of both measurement of their size and 
wider liberalization discussion.  One is to separately examine the structure of regulation, 
entry barriers, and mobility restrictions for in each service market.  Different 
restrictions/regulations apply, say, in banking from, say, road transport because of the 
differences in the characteristics of the service.  Under this approach, a restriction on the 
value of reserves of a foreign bank to be retained within a country is a different restriction 
to one which requires, say, that trucks at the border must enter with a full tank.  If they 
are converted into any comparable form in terms of economic impact, this can be 
attempted by examining their cost implications.  However, some restrictions imply a 
fixed cost for entering a market, others change marginal costs, others effectively set 
upper bounds on the quantity of service provided, or establish minimum quality 
standards.  Comparing barriers and evaluating their impacts is thus inherently difficult, 
and the heterogeneity among broad service types (banking, transportation, for instance) is 
a further complication, as is the heterogeneity within categories (types of services offered 
by financial institutions). 
The other approach is that which has been taken in most of the numerical 
modelling literature on trade in services and is to treat all services as a single   22
homogeneous entity.  Unfortunately, this forced and artificial generality can yield 
misleading results if used as the basis for policy debate on global services trade 
liberalization and its impacts on developing countries.  In some more recent literature 
there are partial modifications to the approach, such as attempts to differentiate among 
the various ways that services can be supplied.  The typical treatment is to model FDI 
flows as linked to services provision (along the lines of GATS Mode 3 (commercial 
presence)).  Labour mobility arrangements under GATS Mode 4 (temporary movement 
of service providers) has also been separately modelled.  But classifying functional 
barriers which may be service category specific as part of a general categorization by 
mode of supply remains as the central feature of the approach. 
 
3.2  The GATS Modes of Supply 
  Because of the key role played by negotiation in the WTO in the services area, the 
approach to services taken in General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) becomes 
relevant to both the discussion of and quantification of the impacts of services trade 
liberalization.  This is because it provides the broad framework within which the policy 
community (as distinct from the research community) discuss trade liberalization in 
services.  Until relatively recently the different modes of supply for services have made 
relatively little difference to how economic modelers view services, and this has been one 
of the central weaknesses of their work.  Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2000) 
represent one recent attempt to deal with Mode 3 restrictions; Winters (2002) discusses 
the modelling of Mode 4 restrictions.  These are discussed below.     23
The GATS classifies services into 155 service types, and differentiates between 
four modes of supply.  The modes provide a devise to facilitating the making of 
commitments in negotiation.  These modes are: 
Mode 1:  Cross border supply.  This is where a service is supplied directly to a 
consumer’s country of residence from a supplier’s country of residence 
(eg. legal advice from abroad given by letter or telephone). 
Mode 2: Consumption  abroad.  This is where a service is supplied to a consumer 
by the consumer physically moving to the suppliers country of residence 
to receive the service (eg, a visit to a law office abroad). 
Mode 3: Commercial  presence.  This is where supply of a service by a commercial 
organization involves moving to a consumer’s country of residence (FDI, 
for instance). 
Mode 4:  Presence of Natural Persons.  This is where a service is supplied by the 
(typically temporary) movement of a services provider to the consumer’s 
country of residence (eg. labour mobility of the service provider). 
  Thus under this approach barriers to trade in services are effectively categorized 
both by the type of service to which they apply and by mode of supply.  The idea is that 
in negotiation countries will schedule commitments on barriers to service trade using this 
categorization.  Thus, by way of example, a country which commits to always allow five 
star hotels to operate within their territory schedules a commitment under a type of 
service (tourism) and a mode of supply (commercial presence).  The aim is to have 
negotiations occur through which countries can jointly agree to schedule commitments 
under the structure of the GATS.  This involves a different procedure from the bilateral   24
exchange of concessions on goods trade (extended via MFN) as practised in the old 
GATT. 
  For the purposes of the discussion here, the key point is that while the GATS, in 
effect, provides a vehicle for classifying and cataloging restrictions to the free 
international flow of services; it does not provide an analytical framework for evaluation 
of their impacts.  It is description and classification, not analysis. 
 
3.3  Analytical Issues with the Treatment of Services When Representing Trade 
Barriers 
  To evaluate the impacts of service trade restrictions on developing (or other) 
countries, some method of grouping restrictions on service trade captured by the GATS 
classification scheme must be used which allows their impacts to be assessed within a 
meaningful analytical structure.  One way to proceed is to assume that all service trade 
restrictions have effects equivalent to those of a tariff as they apply to the flow of services 
across borders even though no customs clearance applies and tariffs do not formally 
apply to services.  This is the treatment adopted in most quantitative literature (see 
below) which uses advalorem equivalent treatment of barriers to services trade. 
  In analytical literature, however, barriers to free international flows of services are 
considerably more multifaceted than this, and so alternative formalizations and 
conceptualizations of the barriers at issue are involved.  Many are regulatory in nature, 
and perhaps fit more comfortably within the large literature on industrial organization 
more so than within conventional trade literature.   25
  Thus, by way of example, there may be barriers to entry to domestic markets for 
foreign service providers.  These barriers may be classified under mode 3 of GATS but 
may include not only rights to establish, but also sector specific rules on entry and 
conduct.  Examples would be the scheduling of domestic banks in banking legislation; 
domestic asset rules for insurance policy writers and other such arrangements.  Each of 
these rule regimes is typically sector specific and operates in different ways. 
  There may also be regulations which relate to performance requirements for 
participants in domestic markets.  These may not necessarily discriminate against foreign 
firms, but if domestic practices differ from those used abroad and there are scale 
economies the effect can again be to retard trade.  Further barriers may arise with limits 
on the mobility of service providers (both forms and persons), perhaps requiring use of 
local rather than foreign forms and or local labour in service provision.  Ownership 
barriers, such as in airlines and (in some cases) telecoms and insurance are one example 
of such barriers.  Immigration and visa arrangements yielding GATS mode 4 supply 
restrictions are another.  The latter play a large and central role as far as the impacts of 
service trade flow restrictions on developing countries are concerned. 
  Analytically, all these different barrier treatments will yield different predictions 
as to the effects on trade in service flows relative to modelling which uses ad valorem 
equivalent tariff forms.  Relatively little is known numerically as to the differences in the 
orders of magnitude involved, and/or the signs of the effects from explicit barrier 
representation compared to ad valorem treatment.  In the goods area (especially in 
agriculture) it is thought the differences between advalorem equivalent form and explicit 
representation can be major.   26
3.4  Ad Valorem Treatments of Barriers, Frequency Indices, Price Based and 
Quantity Based Measures
2 
  As noted above, the approach followed in most of the numerical modelling 
literature on services is to treat barriers to services trade in advalorem form, as either 
tariff or non tariff equivalent instruments.  A widely used approach to gauge their 
quantitative impact is to construct frequency measures showing the extent of usage of 
service trade restrictions, from which the severity of the impacts of such measures on 
trade flows are loosely inferred.  To be fair to this work, no major claims are made that 
these measures tell one very much about the true quantitative impact of restrictions on 
trade flows.  They appear to be both constructed and used as few alternatives seem 
available and there is an understandable demand for some form of quantitative 
assessment. 
The key paper here, is by Hoekman (1995) who uses the GATS commitment of 
schedules of member countries to make a series of calculations.  He utilizes all 155 
service categories in GATS and the four modes of supply for each importing country and 
gives values of 1, 0.5, or 0 to each category/mode possibility for each country depending 
upon frequency of use of measures.  If no restrictions apply for a given mode of supply in 
a given sector a value of 0 is assigned.  If restrictions operate for a given mode of supply 
in a given sector a value of 0.5 is assigned.  These scores are labeled openness/binding 
factors.  He then aggregates the resulting assigned values across modes and across service 
categories.   
                                                 
2 This section draws on the discussion of the literature attempting to use these various approaches these 
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  Hoekman uses these assigned scores to calculate three ratios for each sector.  The 
first sums indices and divides them by 620 (155 × 4) for each country.  The second 
calculates the sectors/modes listed with restrictions as a share of the maximum possible, 
weighted by the openness/binding factors.  The third calculates the share of no restriction 
entries in either a member country’s total commitments or relative to the universe of 155 
possible sectors. 
  A number of subsequent authors (particularly those associated with extensive 
work undertaken by the Australian Productivity Commission) have extended this 
approach and constructed more elaborate frequency measures which they label as trade 
restrictiveness indices.  The basic approach, however, remains the same and most of the 
difficulties of interpretation which the Hoekman frequency measures encounter remain.  
Since Hoekman’s paper these measures have been calculated in a series of industry 
studies; for telecoms by Warren (2001a and 2001b); for banking by McGuire and Schnele 
(2001a); for maritime transport by McGuire et al (2001b); for education by Kemp (2001); 
for distribution by Kalirajan (2000) and for professional services by Nguyen-Hong 
(2000).  Hardin and Holmes (1997) also use frequency indices to evaluate barriers to FDI 
across service industries.  The edited volume by Findlay and Warren (2001) contains an 
accessible and helpful compilation of some of this work. 
  In calculating these extended frequency indices, information on actual restrictions 
on trade and investment in specific service industries is typically drawn on from a wider 
range of sources than just the GATS schedules.  Restrictions receive subjective scores 
and are then grouped into categories, and each given a numerical weighting.  These 
typically reflect some form of subjective assessment of the costs of these restrictions in   28
terms of economic inefficiency.  Several indices are typically calculated for each industry 
to yield measures for different notions of barriers to trade. 
  As an alternative to the frequency index approach to measuring barriers, price 
based measures of barriers to service trade have been proposed, but thus far little 
calculated.  Ideally they should reflect differences between domestic and foreign prices 
for key service categories across supplying and using countries.  Francois and Hoekman 
(1999) propose (but do not construct) a measure based on gross operating margins.  They 
suggest these should be measured in ratio form as (total sales revenue minus total average 
costs)/total average costs.  Alternatively, price based measures have been constructed 
using econometric methods to construct cross country cost measures by Trewin (2001) 
for telecoms, Kalirajan et al (2001) for banking, Kang (2001) for maritime transport, 
Kalirajan (2000) for food distribution, and Nguyen-Hong (2000) for engineering services. 
  Quantity based measures of the severity of service trade restrictions are typically 
based on results of econometric models.  The idea is that these should in some way 
reflect the determinants of service trade and hence be able to predict what service trade 
flows would be if there were no restrictions in place.  This work typically extends earlier 
work of this type used for goods trade to measure barriers to goods flows by residual.  
Francois and Hoekman (1999), for instance, fit a gravity model to bilateral trade flows in 
services between the United States and its trading partners.  Differences between 
predicted and actual trade are then taken to imply the effects of barriers to trade.  Warren 
(2001) uses an alternative econometric procedure to develop quantity based measures for 
barriers facing trade in telecommunications services. 
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3.5  Pitfalls in the Measurement of Service Trade Barriers 
  These measures of barriers to service trade flows, while clearly defensible on the 
grounds that this is all there is, nonetheless encounters numerous pitfalls and must 
therefore be used with great care.  This makes any quantitative discussion of impacts of 
services trade liberalization on developing countries using them difficult to interpret with 
confidence. 
  First there is the issue that with multiple restraints on trade it is not clear which 
restrictions are binding and which are not.  While frequency data only evaluate whether 
restrictions apply for each of 620 GATS cells for a given service type and across all four 
modes of supply, it is not clear that all aggregated restrictions are, in fact, binding 
restraints on trade.  Some may restrict trade, some may not.  Some may compound one 
with another, others may offset each other.  In the literature on economic distortions in 
general, such as tax policy, the extent to which curious legal instruments of intervention 
in practice compound or offset is a major theme of literature.  None of this appears to be 
present in the literature on service trade restrictions. 
  Second, just because restrictions are present their quantitative significance need 
not be the same across restrictions.  Their marginal effects on trade will typically differ.  
And yet in frequency measures they are aggregated as if they are all in some sense 
equiproportional in impact.  There seems no logical reason why this need be the case. 
  Other problems can also arise.  Frequency measures may mask country 
discrimination in the application of barriers, even though both de jure and de facto 
discrimination are considered breaches of national treatment under the GATS.  Offsetting 
subsidy type and restrictive measures may apply and these offsets will need to be taken   30
into account.  Defacto application of regulation and dejure form can differ, just as applied 
and bound tariff rates differ for trade in goods. 
  As far as quantity based measures are concerned, measures are typically based on 
model generated residuals given by observations relative to econometric model 
predictions.  Not only is there much debate as to which is the most appropriate model for 
such purposes, barrier estimates obtained in this way can be negative even when no trade 
restricting interventions apply.  Also, quantity based measures can be positive even when 
frequency indices are zero. 
  Price based measures also have problems of interpretation.  Not only is price data 
on service types extremely hard to obtain, at a conceptual level differences in domestic 
regulation can imply differences in costs of service provision in different markets and 
hence prices across countries even if there are no formal barriers.  Thus price differences 
across countries for services need not be related to barriers, even if they could be 
measured.  Moreover, the price changes generated by a barrier depends on demand and 
supply elasticities, and without elasticity estimates (which are not available) it is not 
possible to move easily between observed price differences and ad valorem barriers 
which models implicitly assume generated them. 
  Thus interpreting barrier measures for services trade faces many pitfalls.  One can 
argue this is true in general for most observations of economic phenomena interpreted in 
some analytical model equivalent form, but at the end of the day the problems with 
barrier estimates for service trade seem especially severe.  They seem to be used solely as 
the best alternative given the policy prerogative of providing some form of numerical 
assessment of impact of proposed policy change.  Evaluated their reliability relative to   31
any form of absolute standard is clearly difficult, but it would seem that for now they can 
only be described as wanting. 
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4.  Quantifying the Impacts of Trade Liberalization in Services on
 Developing  Countries 
  Beyond measuring the size of service trade barriers, a number of studies also 
attempt to quantify the impacts which would follow if global liberalization involving 
lowering them were to occur.  Some of the results from these models explicitly relate to 
poorer developing countries.  These quantitative studies in the main involve the use of 
numerical general equilibrium models.  They are used to make counterfactual equilibrium 
calculations in which barriers to service trade flows are allowed to change and base case 
data and simulated equilibria compared.  This involves calibration to a base case data set 
and the use of various loosely specified and quasi literature based elasticities which are 
key to the counterfactual behaviour these models predict.  The use of these models to 
analyze liberalization barriers to the full international flow of goods is reviewed in 
Shoven and Whalley (1984) and Reinert and Francois (1997). 
 
4.1 Model  Features 
  There are a range of model treatments used in the these models.  Key papers are 
Robinson, Wang, and Martin (1999), Dee and Hanslow (2000), and Brown, Deardorff 
and Stern (2002).  Typically, services are treated in these models very much like goods 
with producer services modeled as an intermediate good, and some models also allow 
trade to be generated by differences in factor endowments as well as by product 
differentiation as in more recent goods trade models.  As in the modelling of goods trade, 
some models (such as Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (1999)) allow for multinational 
activity and endogenous choice by multinational forms of whether to export or set up a   33
branch plant.  Models typically do not explicitly represent the different modes of supply 
in the GATS, although FDI flows (close to mode 3) and labour mobility restrictions are 
captured in more recent models.  Winters (2002), and Winters, Walmsley, Wang, and 
Grynberg (2002) explicitly discuss the modelling of mode 4 GATS restrictions to service 
flows.  It is not a feature of these models that they employ explicit characterizations of 
individual service elements (banking, insurance, etc.) and these are typically not 
explicitly recognized. 
 
4.2  Overview  of Model Results 
  The results from these models typically show that multilateral liberalization of 
services trade will increase global income and welfare, but they also show that the 
distribution of the resulting gains is sensitive to the model specification used.  This point 
is important in understanding what the model implications of global liberalization in 
services are for developing countries. 
  Overall, there tend to be global gains from liberalization of service flows and they 
tend to accrue to all countries, but the effects are sometimes relatively small.  Reductions 
in barriers are typically much larger than occurs for goods, but the magnitudes of gain are 
of a similar order to those obtained from earlier simulations of the effects of freer goods 
trade.  By way of example, Dee and Hanslow report results which they suggest show the 
world would be better off by $260 billion if all post Uruguay Round barriers to trade in 
both goods (manufactures and agriculture) and services were eliminated.  About $50 
billion of gains comes from agricultural liberalization, $80 billion comes from 
manufactures liberalization, and around $130 billion form services liberalization.  Simply   34
put global gains from remaining goods liberalization (including agriculture) and services 
liberalization are of a similar magnitude.  The $260 billion global gain compares to initial 
GATT estimates of $500 billion/year form Uruguay Round liberalization (see Francois, 
McDonald, and Nordstrom (1994)), and later ranges of $90-$300 billion (see Whalley 
(2000)).  The Uruguay Round estimates had no meaningful estimates of gains from 
services trade liberalization. 
A possible explanation of the seeming paradox of equal size effects across goods 
and services in Dee and Hanslow’s results is that larger barriers apply to a smaller 
fraction of trade in the service area, and so gains relative to GDP are similar for goods 
and services (accepting the analytical structure and parameter values used).  An important 
characteristic of this set model results is that where as in Brown et al (1996), Chadha 
(2000), and Benjamin and Diao (2000) there is no endogeneity in foreign direct 
investment, gains tend to be positive throughout the world.
3  Where, however, studies 
explicitly incorporate foreign direct investment flows results are considerably different 
(as in Markusen et al (2000)), suggesting that liberalization involving commercial 
presence (mode 3 in GATS) could well be an important factor in services trade 
liberalization. 
Robinson et al (1999) report no welfare effects from services trade liberalization 
but instead focus on output and trade effects.  They show small output effects in most 
regions (I 2%) with perhaps surprisingly negatives in service industries and positives in 
manufacturing and agriculture.  The largest positive effect is a +8.3% output increase for 
trade and transportation in the Asian NICS; the largest negative is a 3.37% fall in output 
                                                 
3 Copeland (2002) emphasizes this point, and the related point below concerning results from models that 
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of public housing in ASEAN.  They do, however, show very large export effects (over 
50% increases in trade, transport, private and public services) in most countries.  Their 
model also captures induced effects on total factor productivity growth. 
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) assume a 33% reduction in all barriers to 
global trade in both goods and services to characterize an eventual outcome of the WTO 
Doha Round.  They show a small welfare loss from liberalization in agriculture 
(seemingly due to the elimination of export subsidies), global welfare gains of $103 
billion from reductions in manufactures tariffs, and a much larger gain of $413 billion 
from services liberalization.  The largest absolute gains go to the developed countries.  
 
4.3  Interpreting Model Results 
Both interpreting model results and understanding why they occur is 
unfortunately often difficult and authors do not always provide clear explanations for all 
features of their analyses.  The results in Dee and Hanslow produce a good example of 
the many pitfalls that can.  They show that of the additional US $130 billion of gains 
arising from services trade liberalization, about $100 billion would accrue in China alone.  
Global services trade liberalization in their model results seemingly imply that effects 
involving access for foreigners to the Chinese market will dominate all other aspects of 
services trade liberalization. 
Dee and Hanslow seemingly offer no explanation for this result in their text other 
than to say large barriers are involved in the Chinese case.  The barriers are indeed large; 
a little over 250% as tax equivalent barriers to foreign affiliate capital in the Chinese 
market.  These seemingly come from a strong assumption that barriers to all services in   36
China can be represented as tax equivalents (mark ups of price over cost) for banking and 
telecommunications.  They use a Kalirajan et al (2001) study which measures the effects 
of trade restrictions on the net interest margins of banks, a direct measure of banks mark 
up of price over cost.  They also use Warren’s measures of the effects of trade restrictions 
on the quantities of telecommunications services delivered, converting these to a price 
impacts using estimates of price elasticities of demand for telecommunication services.  
Dee and Hanslow’s results seemingly follow directly from the very large barrier 
estimates for China. 
Not only is it highly questionable whether barriers in banking and 
telecommunications reflect barriers generally to service providers in the Chinese market, 
one can also query whether these barrier measures really make sense.  In China, four 
large state owned banks provide most of the financing to the large state owned enterprise 
sector and suffer from major non performing loans and make losses.  Rate spreads at the 
margin are high, but foreign entrants to the market lending under similar conditions 
would also require large spreads.  Smaller private banks lending only to the commercial 
sector have much smaller spreads.  At the margin, a 250% barrier may make no sense.  
Also, in telecommunications converting quantity impacts to barrier estimates using only 
demand elasticities (for which estimates are anyway unreliable) and not also supply 
elasticities is hard to interpret.  Everything in the results seemingly follows from barrier 
estimates, but one is unsure one can believe them.  And sellers do not comment on their 
reliability when discussing model results. 
Dee and Hanslow (2000) also find that while service trade liberalization raises 
overall world income the US and other developed countries can experience welfare losses   37
with no explanation provided for this feature of model results.  In contrast certain 
developing countries, and particularly China as noted above, experience large welfare 
gains (14% of GDP for China) largely due to the large asymmetry in initial barrier sizes 
in services across developed and developing countries. 
  Brown, Deardorff and Stern explicitly modify their earlier analyses to incorporate 
foreign direct investment flows, and also obtain considerably larger welfare effects from 
services liberalization, showing that the world as a whole gains while some countries 
lose.  Economies such as Japan and Hong Kong show large gains; the US loses under 
some specifications gains under others; Canada loses.  The larger size of service barriers 
then goods barriers and their relative size assumed countries seems to be key.  They do 
not seem to report the barrier estimates they use in their text, and neither do Robinson et 
al. 
 
4.4  Possible Themes of Results 
  Discounting the issue of the reliability of the barrier estimates, these modelling 
results can be taken as suggesting that a removal of service trade restrictions which 
implies barriers towards foreign investment flows whose removal attracts capital to 
countries that had earlier had large barriers towards inward investment flows can yield 
significant gains, as in China.  Barriers to entry for service providers in these markets can 
also in some cases generate rents part of which accrue to foreign investors; liberalization 
of services trade can erode these.  While there are also terms of trade effects generated by 
induced FDI flows, as discussed in Brown et al (1996), these also arise in non FDI 
models.  Hence the added feature of factor flow liberalization which mode 3 and 4 GATS   38
liberalization facilitates seem to be key to model results.  If developing countries are able 
to use service trade liberalization to attract inward capital flows this suggests 
considerable gains to them.  At the same time unilateral changes in investment regimes, 
independently of changes in trade barriers in services might achieve much the same result 
(such as relaxation of equity limits on foreign participation in key sectors).  This 
differentiation between services trade liberalization and unilateral changes in investment 
barriers may seem somewhat confusing given that most FDI is in the services sector; and 
that restrictions on FDI (eg screening, equity limits) need to be scheduled as mode 3 
restrictions in the relevant GATS sector.  But mode 3 GATS liberalization in services is 
all about changing the conditions for foreign capital to enter the relevant domestic sector. 
 
4.5  Modeling Mode 4 Restrictions 
  This also raises the issue of what might happen were significant liberalization of 
services under mode 4 supply to allow significant movement of service providers.  Some 
years ago, Hamilton and Whalley (1984) produced a calculation of the potential impacts 
on the global economy from the elimination of all restrictions on labour mobility.  While 
clearly extreme as a liberalization scenario, they showed that under some conditions 
worldwide income could more than double and there would be major distributional 
impacts across countries.  Thus, explicitly modelling mode 4 supply services 
liberalization would seem to be the potential source of even larger effects. 
  This work on mode 4 is not without its difficulties, in particular because most 
countries require foreign workers to be paid at the same rates as nationals (thereby 
undermining the cost advantage of DC suppliers).  This is a limitation on the quantitative   39
studies showing gains from greater labour mobility.  Labour market 
restrictions/regulations are equally important (regulation of pay and conditions, 
recognition of qualifications, etc.).  Further mode 4 only covers temporary movement – 
permanent migration is explicitly excluded.  GATS technical definitions aside, the 
economic impact and policy questions are different for temporary and permanent 
migration. 
  Winters (2001) provides a later calculation which modifies the Hamilton-Whalley 
assumption of homogeneous labour across countries, by assuming that when workers 
move from low to high income countries only one quarter of the productivity difference 
is returned as a higher wage.  Under this modified assumption gains fall to only $300 
billion/year, but still more than the gains from global liberalization of both goods and 
factors reported by Dee and Hanslow (2000).  Similar sensitivity analyses in which global 
gains from elimination of migration restrictions are reduced when efficiency differences 
in labour are assumed across countries were also reported in the original Hamilton-
Whalley paper. 
  Winters et al (2002) also indicate that large potential gains would follow from 
only a small increase in the movement of people between low and high income countries.  
They suggest that increasing developed country quotas for incoming temporary 
movement of natural persons (TMNP) by 3% of the existing labour will generate global 
income gains of $150 billion/year, emphasizing the large benefits that would follow from 
even modest liberalization of mode 4 GATS restrictions of service provider mobility.  
Winters (2002) further discusses the economic implications of liberalizing mode 4 
restrictions.   40
  At present lower developing country labour costs show up more in services trade 
via mode 1 than mode 4, given that many countries require equal pay for mode 4 entrants 
compared to nationals.  In some sectors, in particular professional and computer services, 
out-sourcing has been driven by the lower wages of professionals in DCs.  Out-sourcing 
of not only data entry, but increasingly research and other more skilled work, involves 
service supply via mode 1 and not mode 4 and hence even without mode 4 liberalization 
significant gains can occur.  Out-sourcing effective poorly captured in existing studies. 
 
4.6 Overview 
  So an overview of model themes might be that while all these studies focus on 
multilateral liberalization of global trade in services rather than unilateral liberalization as 
discussed earlier, they all seem to point in the same direction in terms of general effects.  
More precise effects by country differ considerably.  They suggest that if services are 
liberalized with no accompanying liberalization of factor markets, as in goods trade gains 
are small.  If, however, services liberalization becomes a mechanism through which  
impediments to factor flows (FDI) are removed, then gains are large and uneven across 
countries.  Importantly, it seems that the large effects in these model results need not 
come from liberalization of service trade, per se, but from the assumed accompanying 
liberalization of factor markets.  This is parallel to work on goods trade, where 
accompanying liberalization of factor markets internationally also produces sometimes 
large and uneven effects across countries. 
  Thus a major role for service trade liberalization may be to serve as surrogate 
global factor market liberalization by allowing for freer factor flows under modes 3 and 4   41
of GATS schedules.  While such liberalization may be hard to achieve directly, achieving 
it indirectly under the name of service trade liberalization may be the source of major 
gain and also country impact.  It may also be the major issue at stake for the developing 
countries in services negotiations in the WTO.  Attracting more capital, and achieving a 
labour outflow so as to reapportion factor ratios across broad blocs of countries, might be 
the source of largest global gain and distributional impact across countries from services 
trade liberalization.   42
5.  Econometric Literature on Growth Performance and Services 
Trade Liberalization
4 
  Recent econometric work by Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian (2001) and 
Francois and Schuknecht (1999) takes a different approach to assessing the implications 
of trade liberalization in services and evaluates the links between growth performance 
and service sector liberalization.  This literature is also relevant to any discussion of the 
impacts of services trade liberalization on developing countries. 
 
5.1 Early  Literature 
Though this work shows a significant and strong relationship between growth 
performance and openness in key service sectors, discussion of these issues is in fact 
considerably older.  Goldsmith (1969), in a seminal earlier piece, placed heavy stress on 
the role of financial services in allowing financial investments to flow to their most 
productive uses, and hence in generating growth of output and income.  He suggested that 
the ratio of the value of financial intermediary assets to GNP was a variable that in some 
way represented country performance of the financial sector.  He used it in a regression in 
which economic growth rates were the dependent variable, and found what he termed a 
“rough parallelism” between growth performance and the level of financial development 
as represented by this variable.  This lead to later work all pointing in the same direction 
as recent work, namely that openness and degree of development of the service sectors is 
associated with stronger growth performance. 
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  King and Levine (1993), in later work subsequently controlled for other factors 
influencing long run growth performance.  They used further measures of country 
development for the financial sector in their growth regressions, including the ratio of 
liabilities in the financial system to GDP and the ratio of gross claims on the private 
sector to GDP.    They found that these measures played an important role and implied an 
econometrically significant relationship.  They assessed whether the level of country 
financial sector development in 1960 as measured by one of their ratios predicted the rate 
of growth for the country over the 1960-1990 period, and found that the level of financial 
sector development in 1960 was a significant predictor of later period economic growth. 
  In a later paper Levine (1997) further assessed the role that financial sectors 
played in economic development.  He evaluated five functions performed by the financial 
services sector, including facilitating the trading of risk, allocating capital to its most 
productive uses, monitoring managerial performance, mobilizing savings through 
financial innovation, and easing the exchange of goods and services. 
 
5.2 Recent  Work 
  It is only in more recent work, however, that the role of trade and openness in 
service sectors and their influence on growth surfaces more explicitly.  Francois and 
Schuknecht (2000) regress growth rates of real per capita GDP on a measure of the 
degree of openness in trade, key macroeconomic variables, and a measure of 
concentration in the financial sector.  They find a strong relationship between growth 
rates and financial sector competition, this claim suggesting a positive link between 
openness and trade.   44
  Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian (2001) use policy rather than results based 
measures of openness of country services regimes (in contrast to Francois and 
Schuknecht).  They construct such openness measures for two key service sectors, basic 
telecoms and financial services and use these in growth regressions.  Their econometric 
evidence shows that openness in service sectors influences long run growth performance.  
This link is relatively strong in the financial sector and less strong (but nevertheless 
statistically significant) in the telecommunications sector.  Their estimates suggest that 
with fully globally open telecom and financial service sectors, growth rates in individual 
economies may be up to 1.5 percentage points higher than for other countries with more 
closed regimes. 
 
5.3  Issues of Interpretation 
  At first sight this evidence seems striking, pointing to liberalization of service 
sectors as a route to faster growth and development, and suggesting that trade 
liberalization in service sectors can also be key for developing countries in achieving 
enhanced growth performance.  There are, however, issues this work raises as with earlier 
work reviewed here. 
  One is that this work is generally a theoretical and does not provide solid 
analytical underpinnings for service trade liberalization and its links to growth 
performance.  Although Francois and Schuknecht emphasize the role of scale economies 
and cost structures in financial services and the link to market structure, their theory 
points (as in most theoretical work on trade liberalization) to once and for all level effects 
rather than permanent growth effects.  Thus whether elevated growth from liberalization   45
is only a transitional effect, or a more permanent effect of longer standing is the issue.  
Indeed, there are parts of the endogenous growth literature (such as Young (1996)) that 
suggest there are ways in which trade barriers which partly internalize an internalized 
externalities can raise growth rates and protection can be welfare improving.  At first 
sight, such arguments might well also apply to services.  However, also following 
endogenous growth literature, a key characteristic of services trade – the need for 
simultaneous production and consumption of the traded service – might imply that 
services liberalization moves resources from sectors that do not possess these attributes to 
those that do, and long run growth rates rise. 
  Also, there are key issues with excluded variables in these analyses.  Thus, in 
discussing financial services liberalization, there is clear evidence that economies with 
higher savings rates grow more quickly as investible funds are channelled into productive 
employment.  The links between financial structure and development are long discussed, 
in both McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), for instance.  Financial intermediation will 
thus correspondingly grow with savings as intermediation helps these savings flow from 
lenders to borrowers.  What drives the growth is primarily the higher level of savings and 
investment, what facilitates the process is the intermediation.  Thus opening up financial 
services sectors to international competition where domestic savings rates are low need 
not facilitate higher growth, and to attribute higher growth rates to elevated financial 
intermediation alone can again potentially be misleading. 
  This econometric evidence, however, has been widely cited as showing a strong 
link between financial services liberalization and growth performance; and if correct has   46
major implications for policy reform in developing countries.  The caveats noted above 
should, however be kept in mind in interpreting results.   47
6.  Sectoral Issues:  Health and Transportation 
  Two key sectors which have attracted attention as possible areas for developing 
countries to focus on in their services liberalization are health services and transportation.  
These are briefly discussed here, even though model based analyses do not centre on 
these. 
 
6.1 Health  Services 
  Here, it is often claimed that health services represent an area in which developing 
countries have the potential to become major exporters; either by attracting foreign 
patients to domestic hospitals and health care facilities or by sending health workers 
abroad temporarily.  As Mattoo (1999) points out, Cuba provides an example of this.  
There, government policy is to make Cuba into a world medical leader.  A trading 
company, SERVIMED, was created by the government to offer tourism/health packages.  
In 1995/96, according to Mattoo, 25,000 patients and 1,500 students went to Cuba for 
treatment and training generating revenues for Cuba of US $25 million in the year.  Cost 
savings for both patients and insurers can be very significant.  Mattoo suggests that the 
cost of coronary bypass surgery in India is about 5% of that in developed countries.  The 
UN and WHO (1998) estimate the cost of liver transplants in India to be about one tenth 
of that in the United States. 
  There are many barriers to international trade in health services, not the least of 
which is portability of health insurance coverage.  For instance, US federal or state 
government employee coverage is limited to certified practitioners in the United States 
(or a specified state.  The UN and WTO (1998)) estimate that 3% of the 100 elderly   48
living in OECD countries retiring to developing countries would bring revenues of 
perhaps US $10-15 billion a year in medical expenses to developing countries.  Another 
barrier is visa and house purchase/registration restrictions in the developing world that 
potential longer term patients face.  Prima facie, the potential benefits to developing 
countries in this area seem large, but there appears to be few or no quantitative studies. 
 
Transport Services 
  In the area of transport services, there is a general presumption that no other 
services category has such a pronounced effect on both the level and pattern of 
developing county trade.  Internal transportation is costly and time consuming, and 
presents barriers to trade in goods not only in terms of financial cost but also in terms of 
spoilage and breakage.  In ocean shipping, negotiated bilateral freight rates between ports 
of countries often imply large costs for transshipment between ports of developing 
countries.  Much inter developing country trade can take place via OECD ports (Lagos to 
Accra via Rotterdam, for instance), and negotiated freight rates partially drive this.  (See 
Zerby and Conlon (1983).) 
  In addition developing country suppliers of transportation services are restricted 
in terms of access to developed country service markets.  The higher costs of domestic 
providers can be very substantial, and so the benefits of developing country suppliers 
gaining access to these markets could be very large.  Francois, Acre, Reinert and Flynn 
(1996) in analyzing the Jones Act in the US which restricts coastal US shipping to US 
vessels suggests local US suppliers of shipping services are perhaps 300% more costly 
than low cost foreign suppliers and compute large gains for the US from such   49
liberalization.  It follows that large benefits would also accrue to developing country 
suppliers. 
  Airline transportation represents another area where developing country gains 
from improved access could be large due to their lower costs.  Exclusionary practices 
such as cabotage and denied grant of fifth freedom rights exclude them from internal 
developed country service markets.  These issues are discussed in Findlay (1997).  Thus 
as in health services potentially significant gains would accrue to developing countries 
from genuine multilateral service liberalization. 
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7. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper both discusses the potential impacts of services trade liberalization on 
developing countries and reviews existing quantitative studies.  Its purpose is to distill 
themes from studies rather than to advocate policy change.  The picture that emerges is 
seemingly one of valiant attempts to quantify in the presence of formidable analytical and 
data problems.  The basic intuition seems to be that with genuine two sided (OECD/non 
OECD) liberalization in services that are seemingly considerably labour intensive, the 
potential may be there for significant developing country gains.  This position is 
seemingly not endorsed by studies, neither is it contradicted. 
One difficulty with existing studies is that the conceptual underpinnings of trade 
in services and how analytically this trade differs from trade in goods, if at all, needs to 
be sorted out before impacts on developing countries are discussed.  Key here are 
mobility issues for service providers (both firms and workers), and the functional 
treatment of individual service items (banking, insurance, telecoms, etc.).  Recent 
analytical work suggests that liberalization in these service items need not always yield 
gains.  The discussion and measurement of barriers to service trade is also problematic.  
One is talking of domestic regulation, entry barriers, portability of providers, competition 
policy regimes more so than barriers at national borders as with tariffs.  Both representing 
and quantifying barriers raise major difficulties, and these are spelled out. 
As a result, numerical modelling work on the effects of service trade barriers 
which uses ad valorem equivalent modelling is not fully convincing.  In addition, 
individual country results vary considerably across studies in ways it is hard for outsiders 
to recognize.  Studies do, however, point towards a tentative conclusion that effects are   51
small and positive for most countries if FDI flow changes are absent, but much larger and 
more variable across countries if they are present.  This all perhaps suggests that mode 3 
GATS liberalization (roughly captured in some studies) could be very important for 
developing countries; Mode 4 GATS liberalization (not covered) is likely even more 
important given large barriers to labour flows across countries and recent initial studies 
clearly point in this direction. 
If service trade liberalization is a surrogate for improved functioning of global 
factor markets in which more capital flows to developing countries and more labour 
flows from then, developing countries could benefit in a major way.  The paper concludes 
by evaluating recent econometric studies on services liberalization growth linkages, and 
sectoral issues in health services and transportation. 
 
   52
8. References 
Benjamin, N. and X. Diao (2000), “Liberalizing Services Trade in APEC:  A General 
Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition.”  Pacific Economic Review 
5(1). (2000): 49-75. 
Bhattarai, Keshab and John Whalley (1998) “The Division and Size of Gains from 
Liberalization of Service Networks,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper:  6712, August 1998. 
Brown, D., A. Deardorff, A. Fox and R. Stern (1996), “Computational analysis of goods 
and services liberalization in the Uruguay Round” in Martin W. and L. Winters 
eds, The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, Discussion Paper No. 
307, World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 365-80. 
Brown, D., A. Deardorff and R. Stern (2002), “Computational analysis of goods and 
services liberalization in the Uruguay Round and the Doha Development Round” 
Discussion Paper No. 489. Research Seminar in International Economics, School 
of Public Policy, The University of Michigan, 2002. 
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r489.pdf 
Chadha, Rajesh (2000) “GATS and the Developing Countries: A Case Study of India,” in 
Robert M. Stern, (ed.) Services in the International Economy, University of 
Michigan Press, 2000. 
Chadha, R., D. Brown, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (2000), “Computational Analysis of the 
Impact on India of the Uruguay Round and the Forthcoming WTO Trade 
negotiations,” Discussion Paper No. 459, School of Public Policy, University of 
Michigan, 2000.   53
Chen, Zhiqi and Lawrence Schembri (2002) “Measuring the Barriers to Trade in 
Services: Literature and Methodologies” in Curtis, J. M. and D. C. Ciuriak, eds. 
Trade Policy Research 2002. Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, Canada 2002. 
Chia, Ngee Choon and John Whalley (1997) “A Numerical Example Showing Globally 
Welfare-Worsening Liberalization of International Trade in Banking Services,” 
Journal of Policy Modelling, April 1997; 19(2):  119-27. 
Copeland, Brian (2002) “Benefits and costs of trade and investment liberalization in 
services:  Implications from trade theory” in Curtis, J. M. and D. C. Ciuriak, eds. 
Trade Policy Research 2002. Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, Canada 2002. 
Dee, P. and K. Hanslow (2000), “Multilateral Liberalization of Services Trade,” 
Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra. 
Findlay, Christopher (1997), “The APEC Air Transport Schedule” Pacific Economic 
Papers No.273 November 1997 Australia-Japan Research Center ANU. 
Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, (2001) Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement 
and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
Fink, C. and A. Mattoo and I. C. Neagu (2001) “Trade in International Maritime 
Services:  How Much Does Policy Matter?” World Bank wp.2522, 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/1338_wps2522.pdf 
Francois, J., B. McDonald and H. Nordstrom (1994), “The Uruguay Round: A Global 
General Equilibrium Assessment” Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper: 1067 November 1994; 44   54
Francois, J. and L. Schuknecht (1999) “Trade in Financial Services:  Precompetitive 
Effects and Growth Performance,” CEPR Discussion paper 2144, May 1999. 
Francois, J. and L. Schuknecht (2000) “International Trade in Financial Services, 
Competition, and Growth Performance,” Centre for International Economic 
Studies, No. 6. 
Francoise, J., and B. Hoekman (1999), “Market Access in the Service Sectors”, 
Tinbergen Institute, manuscript, 1999. 
Francois J., H. Acre, K. Reinert and J. Flynn (1996), “Commercial Policy and 
the Domestic Carrying Trade” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 29, No. 1. (Feb., 1996), pp. 181-198. 
Goldsmith, Raymond W., (1969), “Financial Structure and Development”, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1969. 
Hamilton, B. and J. Whalley (1984) “Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global 
Restrictions on Labour Mobility:  Calculations and Policy Implications”  Journal 
of Development Economics, 14(1-2) January-February 1984, pp. 61-75. 
Hardin, A., and L. Holmes (1997), “Services Trade and Foreign Direct Investment”, Staff 
Research Paper, Industry Commission.  Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Services. 
Hoekman, B. (1995) “Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services,” in W. 
Martin and L.A. Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and the Developing 
Economies, Discussion Paper No. 307, World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 327-64.  
Kalirajan, Kaleeswaran (2000), “Restrictions on Trade in Distribution Services,” 
Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra.    55
Kalirajan, K., G. McGuire, D. Nguyen-Hong and M. Schuele (2001), “The price impact 
of restrictions on banking services”, in Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, 
Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, New 
York: Routledge. 
Kang (2001), “Trade in Education Services and the Impacts of Barriers to Trade,” in 
Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement 
and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
Kemp, S (2001), “Trade in Education Services and the Impacts of Barriers to Trade,” in 
Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement 
and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
King, R. G. and R. Levine (1993), “Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth:  Theory and 
Evidence,”  Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXII (1993). 
Levine, Ross (1997), “Financial Development and Economic Growth:  Views and 
Agenda”, Journal of Economic Literature, June 1997. 
Markusen, J. and T. Rutherford  (2002), “Developing domestiv entrepreneurship and 
growth through imported expertise,” CEBR Discussion paper NO. 2002-12. 
Markusen, J.,  T. Rutherford and D. Tarr (2000), “Foreign Direct Investment in Services 
and the Domestic Market for Expertise,”  Policy Research Paper No. 2413, World 
Bank, Washington D.C. August. 
Mattoo, Aaditya (1999), “ Financial Services and the WTO: Liberalization Commitments 
of the Developing and Transition Economies”, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 2184, Developing Research Group, World Bank, September 1999.   56
Mattoo, A., R. Rathindran and A. Subramanian (2001) “Measuring Services Trade 
Liberalization and its Impact on Trade Growth:  An Illustration,” World Bank 
Working Paper 2655. 
McGuire, G. and M. Schuele (2001a), “Restrictiveness of International Trade in Banking 
Services”, in Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to Trade in Services: 
Measurement and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
McGuire, G., M. Schuele (2001b) and T. Smith, “Restrictiveness of International Trade 
in Maritime Services”, in Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to Trade in 
Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
McKinnon, Ronald (1973) Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington 
D.C., Brookings.   
 Melvin, James R. (1989) “Trade in Producer Services:  A Heckscher-Ohlin Approach,” 
Journal of Political Economy, October 1989, 97(5):  1180-96. 
Nguyen-Hong, D. (2000), “Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services”, Productivity 
Commission Staff Research Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra. 
Reinert, K. and J. Francois 1997 Applied methods for trade policy analysis: A handbook. 
Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997; xv, 
560. 
Robinson, S., Z. Wang and W. Martin (1999) “Capturing the Implications of Services 
Trade Liberalization,” Invited Paper at the Second Annual Conference on Global 
Economic Analysis, Ebberuk, Denmark, June 20-22. 
Ryan, C. (1990) “Trade Liberalization and Financial Services,” The World Economy, pp. 
349-366.   57
Ryan, C. (1992) “The Integration of Financial Services and Economic Welfare” in A. L. 
Winters ed, Trade flows and trade policy after 1992. Cambridge; New York, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992; 92-118 
Shaw, Edward S. (1973), Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Shoven, J. and J. Whalley (1984) “Applied General Equilibrium Models of Taxation and 
International Trade:  An Introduction and Survey” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 22(3) September 1984, pp. 1007-51. 
Trewin, Ray (2001) “A Price-Impact Measure of Impediments to Trade in 
Telecommunications Services,” in Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to 
Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
United Nations and WHO (1998), “International Trade in Health Services – A 
Development Perspective,” in S. Zarrilli and C. Kinnon, eds, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (Geneva). 
UNCTAD MAST 2.1 (2002)"Measures Affecting Trade in Services (MAST) Database 
Version 2.1" UNCTAD. 
Verikios, G. and X. Zhang (2000) “Sectoral impact of liberalising trade in services,” 
paper presented to the Third Conference on Global Economic Analysis, 
Melbourne, June 27-30, http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/conf/53Verikios.pdf 
Warren, Tony (2001a), “The identification of impediments to trade and investment in 
telecommunications services,” in Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to 
Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge.   58
Warren, Tony (2001b), “The impact on output of impediments to trade and investment in 
telecommunications services,” in Findlay C. and T. Warren, eds, Impediments to 
Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, New York: Routledge. 
Winters, L. Alan (2001), “Assessing the Efficiency Gain for Further Liberalization:  A 
Coment” in Sauve, P. and A. Subramanian, eds, Efficiency, Equity and 
Legitimacy:  The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 2001. 
Winters, L. Alan (2002), “The Economic Implications of Liberalizing Mode 4 Trade”, 
Joint WTO-World Bank Symposium on ‘The Movement of Natural Persons 
(Mode 4) under the GATS’, WTO, Geneva, 11-12 April, 2002. 
Winters, A., T. Walmsley, Z.H. Wang and R. Grunberg (2002), “Negotiating the 
Liberalization of the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons”, Discussion paper 
87, University of Sussex, October 2002. 
Whalley, John (1985) Trade Liberalization Among Major World Trading Areas. 
Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1985. 
Whalley, John (2000) “What can the Developing Countries Infer from the Uruguay 
Round Models for Future Negotiations” Policy Issues in International Trade and 
Commodities, Study Series No.4, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2000. 
Young, Alwyn (1996) “Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing,” in Grossman, Gene 
M. (ed), Economic growth:  Theory and evidence, Volume 1, Elgar Reference 
Collection, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, No. 68, 
Cheltenham, UK:  Elgar, distributed by Ashgate, Brookfield, VT, 1996, pp. 506-
35.  Previously published:  1993.   59
Zerby, J., and R. Conlon (1983) “Joint Costs and Intra-Tariff Cross-Subsidies:  The Case 
of Liner Shipping.”  Journal of Industrial Economics, June 1983, 383-96. 